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I. INTRODUCTION
Ohio v. American Express (Amex)1 is the first case in the United
States in which a court addressed the proper antitrust analysis of
claims against two-sided platforms.2 The overarching lesson from
Amex is that the Supreme Court combined existing antitrust doctrine
with modern economic analysis of multisided platforms to reach a de-
cision that best captures economic reality.3 In applying traditional an-
titrust analysis, the Supreme Court elaborated on (some critics say
departed from) the canonical “rule of reason” cases in ways that can
have meaning for antitrust litigation involving two-sided platforms. In
some respects, what the Court said has meaning for the rule of reason
more broadly.
This Article, written one year after the decision, highlights several
lessons from the Court: (1) vertical agreements by two-sided platforms
are reviewed using a full rule of reason analysis, not an abbreviated or
relaxed approach; (2) as a threshold step to that analysis, a plaintiff
must define a relevant market that includes both sides of two-sided
transaction platforms; and (3) when the relevant market is two-sided,
the plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating harm to competition
in the market as a whole, which means evidence of price and output
1. Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274 (2018). The authors represented Ameri-
can Express.
2. At least one prior Supreme Court decision, Times-Picayune Publ’g Co. v. United
States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953), has addressed antitrust claims against a type of two-
sided platform––but it was in 1953, before the economic literature discussed
“two-sided platforms.”
3. See, e.g., David S. Evans & Richard Schmalensee, The Role of Market Definition
in Assessing Anti-Competitive Harm in Ohio v. American Express, CPI ANTI-
TRUST CHRON., June 2019, at 11, https://www.competitionpolicyinternational
.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/CPI-Evans-Schmalensee.pdf [https://perma.unl
.edu/VSA6-H3YT] (“Sound antitrust policy has always focused on market-specific
competitive realities rather than just applying abstract theory. In markets with
multi-sided platforms, new learning has made it clear that competitive realities
often differ fundamentally from those in ordinary single-sided markets. New
tools may well be necessary to apply traditional principles appropriately in mar-
kets with multi-sided platforms, but there is no reason to abandon those
principles.”).
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effects on one side of the platform is not sufficient to show harm, nor is
evidence of customer loyalty (“insistence”) that the platform earns by
paying incentives.
This Article also addresses some of the criticisms and mispercep-
tions surrounding the decision. Namely, that a subsidy running to cus-
tomers on one side of a two-sided platform is (or should be), by itself, a
basis for antitrust intervention; that a two-sided market definition
need not apply to “mature” transaction platforms; and that the Su-
preme Court’s decision will create uncertainty for platforms and their
customers in terms of the types of agreements that may run afoul of
the Sherman Act and the burden of proof.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF A LONG LITIGATION
In October 2010, U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder announced
that the Department of Justice and seventeen states were suing Visa,
MasterCard, and American Express based on provisions in the credit
card networks’ contracts with merchants. Specifically, the government
alleged that non-discrimination provisions (NDPs) in each network’s
contracts with merchants harmed competition by preventing
merchants from steering customers to other forms of payment at the
point of sale. A decade earlier, Visa and MasterCard lost a significant
antitrust challenge brought by the government to those networks’ ex-
clusivity arrangements with card-issuing banks. This time, Visa and
MasterCard settled immediately and agreed to change their rules.
Amex, however, took the position that the government’s case against
it was seriously flawed and that the NDPs allowed Amex to compete
on an even playing field with the dominant Visa and MasterCard
brands.
The government’s theory focused almost entirely on merchants,
but for Amex the key to the case was the government’s exclusion of the
cardholder. The government argued that Amex’s rules violated the an-
titrust laws because they prevented price competition at the merchant
point of sale, where merchants were unable to steer to credit card net-
works that offered lower merchant rates. Amex argued that the gov-
ernment’s theory missed the way credit card networks compete. Amex
and other networks are two-sided platforms that connect one
merchant and one cardholder in a simultaneous transaction. Demand
between the two sides is interconnected: if a network struggles to gain
acceptance on one side of the platform, it will have a tough time keep-
ing consumers on the other side. But if a network expands on one side,
it becomes more attractive to the other. Amex’s business model
sparked heated competition in the credit card industry by providing
generous rewards and benefits to cardholders, which were funded
with merchant fees. But to fully appreciate that competition, it is es-
sential to examine both sides of the Amex platform. Although eco-
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nomic analysis of two-sided platforms has become well-established in
the academic literature in the last two decades, before the Amex case
it had not been commonly used in the courtroom.
A. The District Court Rules for Plaintiffs Based on a
One-Sided Market Definition
At a 2014 bench trial in the Eastern District of New York, the gov-
ernment’s expert agreed that “an assessment of market definition,
market power and competitive effects should account for the two-sided
nature of the market” and testified that “[i]t is critical not to draw
unwarranted and misleading conclusions by focusing solely on one
side of a two-sided market.”4 The district court found that credit card
networks are simultaneous two-sided platforms with two sides that
“are inextricably linked with one another.”5 However, the court con-
cluded that the relevant market was limited to “network services”—
the half of the platform where credit card networks compete for
merchant acceptance—because “conflat[ing] these separate avenues of
competition into a single product market for ‘transactions’ that is co-
extensive with the platform itself” would “take[ ] the concept of two-
sidedness too far” and “impermissibly and unnecessarily frustrate the
court’s analysis.”6
Based on a one-sided market definition, the district court con-
cluded that the government met its burden to demonstrate harm to
competition in two ways. First, the court made a finding of market
power not because of Amex’s market share (26% of transaction vol-
ume), but instead due to “cardholder insistence” (i.e., consumer loyalty
that could cause cardholders to shop less at merchants that did not
accept Amex cards).7 Second, the court focused on direct evidence of
what it characterized as harm to competition in the form of increased
rates charged to merchants, although the court noted that the govern-
ment presented no empirical evidence that the NDPs had resulted in a
higher “two-sided price” (the price charged across Amex’s entire plat-
form, accounting for both discount revenue and the expense of provid-
ing cardholder rewards).8
4. Joint Appendix at 249–50, Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274 (2018) (No.
16-1454), 2017 WL 6206252.
5. United States v. Am. Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d 143, 173 (E.D.N.Y. 2015).
6. Id. at 172–73; see also id. at 151 (“[T]he court concludes that the relevant market
for its antitrust analysis in this case is the market for [general purpose credit and
charge] card network services.”).
7. Id. at 191.
8. Id. at 215.
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B. The Second Circuit Reverses, Applying a Two-Sided
Market Definition
On appeal, the Second Circuit found that the district court erred by
excluding cardholders from its market definition. Noting the “commer-
cial realities” of the market, including the joint and simultaneous na-
ture of cardholder and merchant demand, the Second Circuit
concluded that “[s]eparating the two markets here—analyzing the ef-
fect of Amex’s vertical restraints on the market for network services
while ignoring their effect on the market for general purpose cards—
ignores the two markets’ interdependence” and “allows legitimate
competitive activities in the market for general purposes to be penal-
ized no matter how output-expanding such activities may be.”9
Applying a two-sided relevant market definition, the Second Cir-
cuit also disagreed with the district court’s conclusions that Amex pos-
sessed sufficient market power to affect competition adversely in the
relevant market and that the nondiscrimination provisions had an ac-
tual adverse effect on competition. As for market power, the Second
Circuit rejected insistence as a basis for market power because card-
holder loyalty simply reflects “competitive benefits on the cardholder
side of the platform and the concomitant competitive benefits to
merchants who choose to accept Amex cards.”10 As for direct evidence
of harm to competition, the Second Circuit held that the district court
“erroneously elevated the interests of merchants above those of card-
holders” because plaintiffs did not present evidence of “the two-sided
net price [that] account[s] for the effects of the [nondiscrimination pro-
visions] on both merchants and cardholders,” particularly in light of
undisputed evidence of increasing output and higher-quality card-
holder benefits.11
C. The Supreme Court Affirms, Embracing a Two-Sided
Market Definition
Several states sought review in the Supreme Court. Although the
United States led the case throughout, it opposed certiorari because
the Second Circuit’s decision did not directly conflict with any Su-
preme Court or Court of Appeals decision. Before Amex, the U.S. Solic-
itor General argued, “the Court has not squarely considered questions
of market-definition or proof of anticompetitive effects in cases involv-
ing two-sided platforms as such . . . . [N]o other court of appeals has
specifically considered the application of the Sherman Act to two-sided
platforms either” and “[f]urther percolation in the lower courts may be
especially useful because of the idiosyncratic character of the agree-
9. United States v. Am. Express Co., 838 F.3d 179, 198 (2d Cir. 2016).
10. Id. at 202.
11. Id. at 204.
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ments at issue here.”12 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari.13
In June 2018, in a 5–4 decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. Writ-
ing for the majority, Justice Thomas concluded that “courts must in-
clude both sides of the platform—merchants and cardholders—when
defining the credit-card market.”14 As he explained, “[t]wo-sided plat-
forms differ from traditional markets in important ways,” in particu-
lar, because they “often exhibit what economists call ‘indirect network
effects,’” which “exist where the value of the two-sided platform to one
group of participants depends on how many members of a different
group participate.”15 “Striking the optimal balance of the prices
charged on each side of the platform is essential for two-sided plat-
forms to maximize the value of their services and to compete with
their rivals.”16 Because of that interconnection, “the fact that two-
sided platforms charge one side a price that is below or above cost
reflects differences in the two sides’ demand elasticity, not market
power or anticompetitive pricing.”17 The majority held that, “[i]n two-
sided transaction markets, only one market should be defined” be-
cause “[a]ny other analysis would lead to mistaken inferences of the
kind that could chill the very conduct the antitrust laws are designed
to protect.”18
Based on that two-sided market definition, the majority concluded
that Amex’s NDPs do not violate federal antitrust law.19 The Govern-
ment’s main argument—that Amex’s NDPs increase merchant fees—
“wrongly focuses on only one side of the two-sided credit-card market
. . . because the product that credit-card companies sell is transac-
tions, not services to merchants, and the competitive effects of a re-
straint on transactions cannot be judged by looking at merchants
alone.”20 Instead, “[t]o demonstrate anticompetitive effects on the two-
sided credit-card market as a whole, the plaintiffs must prove that
Amex’s anti-steering provisions increased the cost of credit-card trans-
actions above a competitive level, reduced the number of credit-card
transactions, or otherwise stifled competition in the credit-card
market.”21
12. Brief for the United States in Opposition at 19–20, Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138
S. Ct. 2274 (2018) (No. 16-1454), 2017 WL 3485653.
13. Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 355 (2017).
14. Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2286 (2018).
15. Id. at 2280.
16. Id. at 2281.
17. Id. at 2285–86.
18. Id. at 2287 (citations omitted).
19. Id. at 2280.
20. Id. at 2287.
21. Id.
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The majority explained that the Government made none of these
showings. Regarding price, “[t]he plaintiffs did not offer any evidence
that the price of credit-card transactions was higher than the price one
would expect to find in a competitive market” and “failed to offer any
reliable measure of Amex’s transaction price or profit margins.”22
With respect to output, the volume of credit-card transactions “grew
dramatically from 2008 to 2013, increasing 30%,” and the Government
presented no evidence that output would have grown any faster with-
out the challenged rules.23 On the subject of quality, “Amex’s business
model spurred Visa and MasterCard to offer new premium card cate-
gories with higher rewards” and “increased the availability of card
services, including free banking and card-payment services for low-
income customers who otherwise would not be served.”24 Accordingly,
the plaintiffs failed to “prov[e] that Amex’s anti-steering provisions
have anticompetitive effects. Amex’s business model has spurred ro-
bust interbrand competition and has increased the quality and quan-
tity of credit-card transactions. And it is the promotion of interbrand
competition, after all, that is the primary purpose of the antitrust
laws.”25
Justice Breyer dissented. Like the district court, he would have
limited the relevant market definition to the network services pro-
vided by credit card networks to merchants, because he believed the
services Amex provided to participants on each side of its platform
were “different but related card services” that were complements, not
substitutes for each other.26 Because “[t]he two categories of services
serve fundamentally different purposes . . . it is difficult to see any
way in which the price of shopper-related services could act as a check
on the card firm’s sale price of merchant-related services,” and there-
fore “there is no justification for treating shopper-related services and
merchant-related services as if they were part of a single market.”27
Regardless, Justice Breyer would have found that the issue of market
definition was irrelevant because of evidence of actual anticompetitive
harm, including what he considered to be some evidence of harm to
competition even with a two-sided market definition. In the end, Jus-
tice Breyer would have held that Amex could have presented evidence
about effects on the consumer side of its platform at step two of the
rule of reason analysis, as proof of procompetitive benefits, but the
burden to make that showing should rest with Amex. To him, the
plaintiffs were not required to account for the cardholder side at step
22. Id. at 2288 (emphasis added).
23. Id.
24. Id. at 2289.
25. Id. at 2290 (citations omitted).
26. Id. at 2291 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
27. Id. at 2296 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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one by establishing a prima facie case of harm to competition on the
merchant side.28
III. LESSONS FROM AMEX
A. Lesson One: A Full Rule of Reason Analysis—Not Some
Form of Relaxed Review Advocated by the
Government—Applies to Vertical Agreements
Between a Platform and Customers on
One Side of the Platform.
An important starting point for the analysis in Amex is that a chal-
lenge to provisions in contracts between a defendant that operates a
two-sided platform and the customers on one side of that platform are
properly reviewed under the rule of reason as vertical agreements. A
shorthand review in the form of a per se rule or “quick look” rule of
reason analysis is inappropriate.
In the Supreme Court, the government and certain amici argued
that the agreements at issue between Amex and merchants who agree
to accept Amex cards were not purely vertical arrangements and,
therefore, could be subject to a form of abbreviated rule of reason anal-
ysis. For example, the United States noted that, because “Amex and
the merchants that accept Amex cards stand in a vertical rather than
a horizontal relationship, the parties and the courts below treated
those contracts as vertical agreements subject to rule-of-reason analy-
sis.” But the United States argued that the “agreements also have a
meaningful horizontal aspect . . . since they restrict the terms on
which merchants may deal with non-Amex as well as Amex customers
and effectively prevent price competition among competing credit-card
networks.”29
Based on that proposition—that Amex’s vertical NDPs “have hori-
zontal effects on interbrand competition”—the states argued that the
Supreme Court “should subject them to more careful scrutiny than
would apply to a lone producer’s vertical restraint restricting in-
trabrand competition.”30 Amici supporting the Government similarly
argued that the Court should apply an analysis to the two-sided plat-
form in this case that relaxed the plaintiffs’ burden because, for exam-
ple, “[t]here is substantively no economic difference between the
dissipation of profits from merchant fees propped up by the Amex re-
28. Id.
29. Brief for the United States in Opposition, supra note 12.
30. Brief for the Petitioners and Respondents Nebraska, et al. at 34, Ohio v. Am.
Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274 (2017) (No. 16-1454), 2017 WL 6205796 (citation
omitted); see also id. at 45 (“Unlike other vertical agreements, Amex’s agree-
ments have the horizontal effect of restricting interbrand price competition be-
tween all competitors, and so trigger the primary purpose of the antitrust laws.”
(citation omitted)).
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straints compared to the dissipation of profits from price fixing,”31 and
because of “the profound effect that the NDPs have on horizontal price
competition in the relevant market for merchant network services.”32
The Supreme Court declined to relax the full rule of reason analy-
sis based on supposed horizontal effects. Amex and other two-sided
platforms have vertical relationships with consumers on each side of
the platform, and vertical restraints “often pose no risk to competi-
tion.”33 As Justice Thomas explained, “[a] horizontal agreement be-
tween competitors is markedly different from a vertical agreement
that incidentally affects one particular method of competition.”34
B. Lesson Two: For That Rule of Reason Analysis, a
Plaintiff First Must Define a Relevant Market That
Includes Both Sides of Two-Sided Transaction
Platforms.
A broader implication of the Supreme Court decision concerns how
courts carry out the rule of reason analysis. In seeking certiorari re-
view, the states claimed that litigants generally had an “increasing
need for guidance on the rule of reason” because “the Court has not
had a recent opportunity to provide concrete guidance over the rule of
reason’s structure.”35
One respect in which the Court provided guidance was by describ-
ing market definition as a prerequisite to the rule of reason analysis
for vertical agreements. The traditional rule of reason analysis follows
a “three-step, burden-shifting framework.” First, “the plaintiff has the
initial burden to prove that the challenged restraint has a substantial
anticompetitive effect that harms consumers in the relevant mar-
ket.”36 Second, “[i]f the plaintiff carries its burden, then the burden
shifts to the defendant to show a procompetitive rationale for the re-
straint.”37 Third, “[i]f the defendant makes this showing, then the bur-
den shifts back to the plaintiff to demonstrate that the procompetitive
efficiencies could be reasonably achieved through less anticompetitive
means.”38 The dispute in Amex primarily concerned the first step. Al-
though the plaintiffs contended that they showed sufficient harm to
31. Brief for Amici Curiae John M. Connor et al. in Support of Petitioners at 23, Ohio
v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274 (2017) (No. 16-1454), 2017 WL 6492474.
32. Brief of 28 Professors of Antitrust Law as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at
15, Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274 (2017) (No. 16-1454), 2017 WL
6492850.
33. Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2285 n.7.
34. Id. at 2290 n.10.
35. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 12, Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274
(2017) (No. 16-1454), 2017 WL 2472075, at 24.
36. Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2284.
37. Id.
38. Id.
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competition in a one-sided market, they also argued that, because
they presented “direct evidence” of harm to some anticompetitive fea-
tures of the NDPs, no precise market definition was required.
The majority instead explained that plaintiffs bear a threshold
burden to define a relevant market, and that this is a critical element
of step one of the rule of reason analysis applied to vertical re-
straints.39 The Court instructed that, at the first step, a plaintiff must
“prove that the challenged restraint has a substantial anticompetitive
effect that harms consumers in the relevant market.”40 That showing
can be made through either indirect or direct evidence of harm to com-
petition, but either path begins by defining a market. The indirect
route calls for “proof of market power”—which requires a defined mar-
ket—“plus some evidence that the challenged restraint harms compe-
tition.”41 The direct route requires “proof of actual detrimental effects
on competition, such as reduced output, increased prices, or decreased
quality in the relevant market.”42 The government contended that, be-
cause it was appealing only the lower court’s holding on the direct evi-
dence case, and did not challenge any ruling below about market
power and indirect evidence, it was not necessary to define a relevant
market, and any deficiency in the market definition proof was irrele-
vant to the issues on appeal. Contrary to the government’s position,
the majority concluded that, to assess direct evidence, “we must first
define the relevant market,” which made it “clear that the plaintiffs’
evidence is insufficient to carry their burden.”43
The dissent considered the market definition requirement a strik-
ing departure from precedent: “[t]he majority thus, in a footnote,
seems categorically to exempt vertical restraints from the ordinary
‘rule of reason’ analysis that has applied to them since the Sherman
Act’s enactment in 1890.”44 But the dissent’s analysis would put the
cart before the horse, suggesting that plaintiffs can show harm to mar-
ket-wide competition without ever defining what market was suppos-
edly impacted by that harm. As a result, the majority took a different
route: “courts usually cannot properly apply the rule of reason without
an accurate definition of the relevant market. Without a definition of
the market there is no way to measure the defendant’s ability to
lessen or destroy competition.”45 Although the government pointed to
earlier cases in which the Court found harm to competition based on
direct evidence without defining a relevant market, the majority dis-
39. Cf. Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187 (2006).
40. Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2284 (emphasis added).
41. Id. at 2284 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 2285.
44. Id. at 2297 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
45. Id. at 2285 (citation omitted).
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tinguished the precedents as involving horizontal restraints that were
more suspect because, by definition, they “involve[d] agreements be-
tween competitors not to compete in some way.”46
In explaining how to define the relevant market, the Supreme
Court left no doubt that a two-sided market definition applies to anal-
ysis of vertical agreements by two-sided platforms that connect con-
sumers for a joint, simultaneous transaction. Most observers agree
that, under Amex, a two-sided relevant market definition will apply to
antitrust claims challenging vertical agreements by two-sided trans-
action platforms that share the characteristics of the credit card mar-
ket identified by the majority: platforms that “facilitate a single,
simultaneous transaction between participants,” which creates a sin-
gle product—a transaction—that is “jointly consumed by” consumers
on each side.47
But what about non-transaction platforms?48 Amex involved a
transaction platform, and at the time of the decision there was little
precedent in the lower courts addressing a broader range of two-sided
platforms (Amex and the United States had opposed certiorari in part
for that reason). But the majority did not expressly limit its rule to
transaction platforms; it explained that two-sided analysis may apply
when “indirect network effects” exist, meaning when “platforms can-
not raise prices on one side without risking a feedback loop of declin-
ing demand.”49 By contrast, the Court said, “[a] market should be
treated as one-sided when the impacts of indirect network effects and
relative pricing in the market are minor.”50 By specific example, the
Court indicated that two-sided analysis may not extend to “the market
for newspaper advertising,” which does not involve “a single, simulta-
neous transaction between participants” and which exhibits “weak in-
direct network effects” with less pronounced “interconnected pricing
46. Id. at 2285 n.7.
47. Id. at 2286, n.8 (citation omitted).
48. Compare FTC, HEARINGS ON COMPETITION AND CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE
21ST CENTURY: THE IDENTIFICATION AND ANALYSIS OF COLLUSIVE, EXCLUSIONARY,
AND PREDATORY CONDUCT BY DIGITAL AND TECHNOLOGY-BASED PLATFORM BUSI-
NESSES (hereinafter, FTC HEARINGS), Tr. 262:1–15 (Oct. 15, 2018) (Joanna Tsai)
(“[M]y reading of [Amex] is that it specifically is applicable to transaction plat-
forms, and other multi-sided platforms may be different . . . .”), with id. at
267:5–10 (Catherine Tucker) (“I don’t read Amex as being limited to transaction
platforms. I think it would have been odd to read the decision in that way given
the many cites . . . to the economic literature, which, of course, is much broader in
terms of the way it characterizes two-sided markets.”).
49. Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2285.
50. Id. at 2286.
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and demand.”51 Ultimately, this analysis will turn on the “commercial
realities” of the industry in question.52
C. Lesson Three: When the Relevant Market is Two-Sided, a
Plaintiff Must Demonstrate That the Challenged
Conduct Harmed Competition in the Market
as a Whole.
In the context of two-sided platforms, Justice Thomas explained
that it is easy to confuse price effects that are consistent with competi-
tion with those that are the result of anticompetitive restraints. This
danger is not new for two-sided platforms. As Justice Kennedy wrote
in Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S.
209, 237 (1993), “rising prices do not themselves permit an inference
of” anticompetitive conduct because if “output is expanding at the
same time prices are increasing, rising prices are equally consistent
with growing product demand.” But the concept has particular signifi-
cance for platforms that compete by balancing prices across their two
sides. As Justice Thomas put it,
the fact that two-sided platforms charge one side a price that is below or above
cost reflects differences in the two sides’ demand elasticity, not market power
or anticompetitive pricing. Price increases on one side of the platform likewise
do not suggest anticompetitive effects without some evidence that they have
increased the overall cost of the platform’s services.53
The Supreme Court made clear that, in the context of two-sided
platforms, courts should carefully scrutinize evidence of increased
prices to ensure that the price effects are linked to reduced output.
The Supreme Court held that, “[e]ven assuming the plaintiffs are cor-
rect” and “evidence shows that the price of Amex’s transactions in-
creased” when considering both sides of its platform, “this evidence
does not prove that Amex’s anti-steering provisions gave it the power
to charge anticompetitive prices.”54 After all, indirect network effects
“limit the platform’s ability to raise overall prices and impose a check
on its market power” because they “encourage companies to take in-
creased profits from a price increase on side A and spend them on side
B to ensure more robust participation on that side.”55
51. Id.
52. Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2285; see also Joshua D. Wright & John M.
Yun, Ohio v. American Express: Implications for Non-Transaction Multisided
Platforms, CPI ANTITRUST CHRON., June 2019, at 7, https://www.competitionpoli
cyinternational.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/CPI-Wright-Yun.pdf [https://per
ma.unl.edu/FDH3-9BCW] (“We argue that the Court’s distinctions between
transaction and non-transaction platforms do not, nor should they, prohibit the
application of the economic logic to the ruling on non-transaction platforms.”).
53. Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2285–86 (citation omitted).
54. Id. at 2288.
55. Id. at 2281 n.1.
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Thus, price increases are competitively significant only if they
demonstrate that the defendant is able to raise prices profitably by
restricting output. Justice Thomas explained that, even if the govern-
ment had presented some evidence that Amex at one point raised
merchant fees without using all of the increase on cardholder rewards,
it would not prove that Amex’s NDPs “gave it the power to charge
anticompetitive prices.”56 To make that showing, a plaintiff must es-
tablish that increased prices in fact resulted from output-restricting
effects of the conduct at issue. Although the dissent thought this stan-
dard set the bar too high,57 the majority disagreed, finding that the
risk of “mistaken inferences” from price effects on one side of a plat-
form would “chill the very conduct the antitrust laws are designed to
protect”—that is, competition with other platforms.58
A final feature from the Amex litigation has received less attention
because the states chose not to challenge it and the Supreme Court
did not directly address it. But in affirming the decision below, the
Supreme Court left intact the Second Circuit’s rejection of “cardholder
insistence” as a basis for market power.
In Amex, the government’s theory of market power was based on
so-called insistent cardholders, or those who were loyal to Amex be-
cause of incentives funded by prices charged to merchants on the other
side of the platform. The Second Circuit panel held that this theory of
market power failed because it did not adequately account for compe-
tition on both sides of the platform. What looked to merchants like
“insistence” by cardholders in fact was the product of intense competi-
tion among card issuers on the other side of network platforms. The
fact that Amex must compete with other networks’ cards to offer “ro-
bust rewards programs” and other benefits to cardholders “indicates,
if anything, a lack of market power.”59 Although the government did
not press their market power theory in the Supreme Court, Justice
Thomas noted the same dynamic:
Amex uses its higher merchant fees to offer its cardholders a more robust re-
wards program, which is necessary to maintain cardholder loyalty and en-
courage the level of spending that makes Amex valuable to merchants. That
Amex allocates prices between merchants and cardholders differently from
Visa and MasterCard is simply not evidence that it wields market power to
achieve anticompetitive ends.60
56. Id. at 2288.
57. Id. at 2302 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[B]ecause the relevant question is a compari-
son between reality and a hypothetical state of affairs, to require actual proof of
reduced output is often to require the impossible—tantamount to saying that the
Sherman Act does not apply at all.”).
58. Id. at 2287 (quoting Brooke Grp. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 113 S.
Ct. 2578, 2589 (1993)).
59. United States v. Am. Express Co., 838 F.3d 179, 203 (2d Cir. 2016) (internal em-
phasis omitted).
60. Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2289.
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IV. MISPERCEPTIONS ABOUT AMEX
A. Fallacy One: Two-Sided Market Definition Does Not
Apply to “Mature” Platforms.
In other litigation, plaintiffs have argued that a two-sided market
definition should not apply to markets that are “mature.” This the-
ory—which the Government did not highlight but which amici
presented to the Supreme Court—posits that,
as two-sided platforms mature, the externalities from each side to the other
can become unimportant and insignificant, rendering the two-sidedness of no
relevance. For example, a mature flight reservation system may not attract
another airline if it adds more users, and vice versa. If so, there are no re-
maining significant two-sided externalities.61
On this basis, before the Supreme Court decision, one district court
concluded that a one-sided relevant market definition was appropriate
for a platform that travel agents use to search for and book airline
flights. The district court allowed the jury to decide that the relevant
market was one-sided, reasoning that, “[w]hen the market becomes
mature, it ceases to be interdependent and two-sided in the economic
sense.”62
However, after Amex, the Second Circuit overturned the jury ver-
dict and judgment because the one-sided market definition was “fun-
damentally at odds” with the Supreme Court’s decision.63 The Second
Circuit read Amex to require two-sided treatment in all cases where a
business “cannot make a sale to one side of the platform without si-
multaneously making a sale to the other.”64 After all, nothing the Su-
preme Court said about two-sided transaction platforms was related
to market-wide maturity. Instead, when analyzing a two-sided trans-
action platform, what matters are network effects at the platform
level, not the market level.65 Two-sided platforms use their individual
two-sided characteristics to compete: “[s]triking the optimal balance of
the prices charged on each side of the platform is essential for two-
sided platforms to maximize the value of their services and to compete
with their rivals.”66 Whether the indirect network effects of these
platforms impact the size of the market as a whole is irrelevant. When
61. Brief for Amici Curiae John M. Connor et al., supra note 31, at 10 n.11.
62. U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Sabre Holdings Corp., No. 11-CV-2725 (LGS), 2017 WL
1064709, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 21, 2017).
63. U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Sabre Holdings Corp., 938 F.3d 43 (2d Cir. 2019).
64. Id. (quoting Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2280).
65. Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2286 (describing the relevant market for
credit card networks as “two-sided platforms” where “courts must include both
sides of the platform—merchants and cardholders—when defining the credit-
card market.”); Sabre, 938 F.3d at 57 (“In cases involving two-sided transaction
platforms, the relevant market must, as a matter of law, include both sides of the
platform.”).
66. Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2281.
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platforms use those effects to compete with each other, Amex dictates
that the GDS market is two-sided. That conclusion also matches Jus-
tice Breyer’s reading of the majority’s rule, which leaves no room for a
mature market exception.67
In addition to the Second Circuit, the only other court to consider
the question after the Supreme Court’s decision agreed that “market
maturity” is no exception to Amex. In recent proceedings in another
case against Amex challenging the NDPs brought by a group of
merchants, plaintiffs argued for a one-sided relevant market defini-
tion, notwithstanding the Supreme Court decision:
[B]ecause Amex, like Visa, MasterCard and Discover, has existed for decades
and is mature . . . . Once a system is mature . . . with tens of millions of people
already using the card and the fixed costs of accepting cards already incurred,
there is no additional indirect network effect flowing to the merchant side of
the platform from the increased use of Amex cards.68
The district court also rejected that argument, explaining that, al-
though the Supreme Court decision did not directly engage with the
market maturity theory, “the Court still held that ‘two-sided transac-
tion platforms exhibit more pronounced indirect network effects’” and
thus that both sides of the platform must be included in the relevant-
market analysis.69
B. Fallacy Two: A Platform’s Conduct Should Be
Condemned If Platform Consumers on One Side Are
“Subsidized” by Those Who Do Not Use
the Platform.
One critique of the NDPs leveled by the government and its amici
was that they harm consumer welfare because they cause “customers
paying with cheap credit cards [to] subsidize the rewards of high-cost
customers.”70 According to the government’s amici, this subsidization
67. Id. at 2298 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (Justice Breyer interpreted the majority deci-
sion to mean that a two-sided relevant market definition is now required for busi-
nesses with four features and stated “they (1) offer different products or services,
(2) to different groups of customers, (3) whom the ‘platform’ connects, (4) in si-
multaneous transactions.”).
68. Plaintiffs’ Response To Defendants’ Motion To Dismiss Or In The Alternative For
Summary Judgment With Respect To The Individual Plaintiffs’ One-Sided and
Amex-Only Relevant Markets at 9, In re Am. Express Anti-Steering Rules Anti-
trust Litig. (II), 361 F. Supp. 3d 324 (E.D.N.Y. 2019).
69. In re Am. Express Anti-Steering Rules Antitrust Litig. (II), 361 F. Supp. 3d 324,
339 (E.D.N.Y. 2019). The district court further explained that “[t]he relevant
question in this instance is whether the Court discussed, and issued a holding on,
whether Amex is a two-sided transaction platform and whether the ‘relevant
market’ for antitrust purposes contains both sides of the platform. Because the
Court did so, the question of whether this holding incorporated the MPs’ maturity
theory is irrelevant.” Id. at 339 n.8.
70. Brief for the Petitioners and Respondents Nebraska et al., supra note 30, at 10
(“[Without the NDPs], retailers would pass on much of the savings from credit-
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results in “inefficient pricing and adverse impacts on consumers” that
“occur even if Amex passed on all its high merchant fees to cardhold-
ers through higher rewards” and “are amplified when other credit
card platforms increase their merchant prices and cardholder benefits
in response to the [NDPs].”71 As the states put it, “[a]llocative effi-
ciency and consumer welfare are not enhanced if Discover cardholders
pay higher prices at the gas station to subsidize an Amex cardholder’s
frequent-flyer miles.”72 Some have suggested that antitrust analysis
in cases like Amex should consider whether “a platform creates nega-
tive externalities for consumers not using the platform.”73 And in dis-
sent, Justice Breyer noted that cross-subsidization in the credit-card
market could “limit the usual relationship between price and output,”
which allowed the challenged provisions to “disrupt the marketplace
by extracting anticompetitive profits,” even though they “have only a
limited effect on credit-card transaction volume.”74
The majority’s analysis gave no weight to the subsidization argu-
ment. Justice Thomas described potential direct evidence of harm—
price, output and quality in the relevant market as a whole—without
accounting for supposed subsidies among groups of consumers within
the market. This approach is consistent with the Supreme Court’s
precedents, which instruct that the purpose of antitrust is advancing
consumer welfare by protecting competition, and “[c]ourts are ill
suited ‘to act as central planners, identifying the proper price, quan-
tity, and other terms of dealing.’”75 The possibility that increased
credit card use imposes an indirect burden on those who do not use
credit cards raises questions of welfare redistribution that are ill-
suited for courts. In fact, in other countries, similar arguments to
those made by the government have been fielded by legislators and
regulators, not judges. As one commentator observed, “[w]e regulate
debit card fees in this country” but “we don’t regulate credit card fees.
It’s hard for me to see that as an antitrust concern.”76
It would be a tall task for courts to unpack subsidization argu-
ments that could be made for countless markets throughout the econ-
omy because consumers frequently bear some cost for services they do
card competition to consumers, typically in the form of a price decrease. With
steering, merchants could seek preference pricing and look to return some of
those savings to their customers.” (citations omitted)).
71. Brief for Amici Curiae John M. Connor et al., supra note 31, at 25.
72. Brief for the Petitioners and Respondents Nebraska et al., supra note 30, at 49.
73. FTC HEARINGS, supra note 48, Tr. at 20:10–13 (Oct. 17, 2018) (Judith Chevalier).
74. Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2302 (2018) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
75. Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline Commc’ns, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1109, 1121 (2009) (quot-
ing Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 124 S. Ct.
872, 875 (2004)).
76. FTC HEARINGS, supra note 48, Tr. at 35:25–36:10 (Oct. 17, 2018) (Richard
Schmalensee).
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not use. Shoppers who use public transportation may “subsidize”
those who use free parking; shoppers who make only small purchases
subsidize those who use shopping carts, etc. The majority in Amex de-
clined to use the rule of reason to regulate two-sided platforms on the
basis that they benefit some consumers more than others.
C. Fallacy Three: Amex Will Complicate and Confuse
Antitrust Analysis in a Wide Range of Cases.
Justice Breyer’s dissent warned that the characteristics identified
by the majority as requiring a two-sided market definition in fact are
“commonplace” and are shared by, for example, “farmers’ markets,”
“travel agents,” and “internet retailers.” Since the decision, some com-
mentators have predicted that courts in many cases will be forced to
spend significant time grappling with hard questions about two-sided-
ness, at the risk of “getting stuck unnecessarily in dealing with the
complexities of two-sided platforms” and doing analysis “rigidly and
mechanistically” as “a distraction from the important issues.”77
One year after the Supreme Court decision (and more than two
years after the Second Circuit ruling), only a handful of disputes about
two-sided market definition have emerged in the lower courts:
• In one of the first cases, In re National Collegiate Athletic Asso-
ciation Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litigation,78 the de-
fendants’ expert opined that the relevant market was “a multi-
sided market for college education in the United States” in
which colleges balance their pricing to many constituencies.
Among other things, the district court concluded that Amex did
not compel a multi-sided market definition in part because “the
relevant interactions are not transactional or simultaneous and
the restraints at issue are not vertical.”79
77. FTC HEARINGS, supra note 48, Tr. at 255:19–256:1 (Oct. 15, 2018) (Tasneem
Chipty); see also, e.g., FTC HEARINGS, Tr. at 101:10–101:12 (describing “the view
that already there’s been defendants filing” to say “we need to start this case
over, we’re a transaction platform”); id. at 219:19–22 (Oct. 16, 2018) (A. Douglas
Melamed) (“AmEx could be dangerous if it unleashed a series of arguments that
would say, well, what I’m doing benefits the other side.”); id. at 251:22–252:9
(Eric Citron) (predicting that lower courts’ post-Amex analysis could “devolve[ ]
into a kind of abstract question about the two-sidedness or eight-sidedness of
AmEx,” which “will be pointless and very likely to confuse.”).
78. In re Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n Grant-In-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., 311 F.R.D.
532 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
79. Order Reaffirming Exclusion of Certain Expert Testimony by Dr. Elzinga at 10,
In re Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n Grant-In-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., No. 4:14-
md-02541-CW, 2018 WL 4241981 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2018). In the alternative, the
court excluded defendants’ expert’s testimony because he did not “perform[ ] any
economic analysis” which the court found “particularly problematic in light of the
undefined number of sides (i.e., constituencies) in [the expert’s] proposed multi-
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• In U.S. Airways v. Sabre, the Second Circuit overturned a jury
verdict that was based on an erroneous one-sided market defi-
nition.80 As discussed above, in that case, an airline brought
federal antitrust claims against Sabre, which operates a plat-
form that travel agents use to search for and book airline
flights. Before Amex, the jury found that the relevant market
was one-sided and entered a verdict for the airline.81 On appeal
after Amex, the Second Circuit vacated the judgment because,
“in a case whose subject is a transaction platform . . . the jury
must be instructed to consider both sides of the platform being
evaluated; the relevant market for such platforms must, as a
matter of law, always include both sides.”82
• As mentioned above, the district court in subsequent merchant
litigation against Amex granted summary judgment to Amex
with respect to plaintiffs’ proposed one-sided or single-brand
(Amex only) market definitions, rejecting arguments by plain-
tiffs that new facts not presented in the government litigation
could lead to a different market definition.83
• Otherwise, parties and courts have alluded to the Amex litiga-
tion without directly invoking its market definition holding.
For example, in Dreamstime.com, LLC v. Google LLC,84 Google
stated Amex raised “more acute” concerns about plaintiffs’ one-
sided market definition of “search advertising,” but asked the
court not to address “the complex market definition issues” for
purposes of Google’s motion to dismiss.
In fact, the most recent antitrust case decided by the Supreme
Court, Apple Inc. v. Pepper,85 also involved a two-sided platform, but
neither of the parties nor the Court cited Amex or directly discussed
the significance of two-sidedness. That case asked whether consumers
on one side of a platform—iPhone users—have standing to challenge
certain alleged restraints imposed by the platform on participants on
the other side—app developers. Apple argued that only app developers
had standing under the rule in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois,86 which
limits antitrust standing to direct purchasers. In a 5–4 decision, Jus-
sided market; the number of sides or constituencies apparently is so large that
[the expert] does not even claim to provide an exhaustive list in his report.” Id.
80. U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Sabre Holdings Corp., 938 F.3d 43 (2d Cir. 2019). The au-
thors were counsel to Sabre for its appeal.
81. See U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Sabre Holdings Corp., 11 Civ. 2725 (LGS), 2017 WL
1064709 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 21, 2017).
82. Id. (emphasis in original).
83. In re Am. Express Anti-Steering Rules Antitrust Litig. (II), 361 F. Supp. 3d 324,
347 (E.D.N.Y. 2019). The authors were counsel to Amex.
84. Dreamstime.com, LLC v. Google, LLC, No. 3:18-cv-01910-WHA (N.D. Cal. June
24, 2018).
85. Apple Inc. v. Pepper, 139 S. Ct. 1514 (2019).
86. Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
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tice Kavanaugh wrote for the majority that iPhone users did have
standing because they “purchased apps directly from Apple and there-
fore are direct purchasers under Illinois Brick.”87 The dissent, written
by Justice Gorsuch, disagreed because “an antitrust plaintiff can’t sue
a defendant for overcharging someone else who might (or might not)
have passed on all (or some) of the overcharge to him,” and allowing
“convoluted ‘pass on’ theories of damages” would require “massive ef-
forts to apportion the recovery among all potential plaintiffs that
could have absorbed part of the overcharge.”88 Although two-sided-
ness was not explicitly mentioned and Amex was not cited, the eco-
nomic characteristics of the defendant’s two-sided platform bore on
the key questions identified by both sides: because Apple connects
iPhone users and app developers for a transaction, consumers on both
sides are direct purchasers from Apple (which the majority found dis-
positive), but the interconnectedness between the two sides makes dis-
entangling potential damages theories difficult (which greatly
concerned the dissent).
Now that the Supreme Court provided some guidance on the ques-
tion of standing in Apple v. Pepper, the method of apportioning anti-
trust damages in two-sided markets could have great significance. In
Sabre, the Second Circuit recently shed light on that question by dis-
cussing the distinction between damages in one- and two-sided mar-
kets: “In a market encompassing both sides of the platform . . . if
prices charged to [consumers on one side] are less—or incentive pay-
ments made are greater—than those that would be observed in a com-
petitive market, then that difference must be accounted for in
determining . . . damages” sought by consumers on the other side.89 In
other words, for a two-sided platform, payments made by the platform
to consumers on one side “necessarily reduce any damages” that con-
sumers on the other side could claim, which meant that “[t]wo-sided
damages must . . . be lower than one-sided damages would have
been.”90
These recent decisions make clear that, although Amex is not caus-
ing confusion, antitrust questions for two-sided platforms are not go-
ing away. Amex provides a sensible framework for answering them.
87. Pepper, 139 S. Ct. at 1519.
88. Id. at 1525–27 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
89. U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Sabre Holdings Corp., 938 F.3d 43, 59 (2d Cir. 2019).
90. Id.
